Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Bailey Service and Supply v. The State of Utah Road
Commission : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Mark A. Madsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellants.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Ray G Martineau; Charles L Maak; David A Greenwood;
Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bailey Service and Supply v. The State of Utah, No. 13857.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1039

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UT*H .~\>'r*f,7>. ,; .,—^
0*-EF

STAl'b Uh UTAH
BAILEY SERVICE & SUPPLY Cor- •»
poration, a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant. )

13857

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Ray G. Martineau
Charles L. Maak
David A. Greenwood
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
MARK A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
JAN2? 75
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Cleri
ReubenSupreme
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
Court,
Utah
Attorneys Machine-generated
for AppellantOCR, may contain
errors.

Fl L

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
VEHICLES WHICH DELIVERED MOST OF
THE PROPERTY DESTINED FOR STORAGE THEREIN AS A RESULT OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIADUCT SO
SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERED WITH OR
D E N I E D THE PROPERTY RIGHT OR
EASEMENT OF ACCESS APPURTENANT
THERETO AS TO AMOUNT TO A TAKING
OF BAILEY'S PROPERTY BY THE STATE.. 30
CONCLUSION

41
CASES CITED

Anderson Investment Corporation v. State, 28 Utah
2d 379, 503 P. 2d 144 (1972)
12
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343,144 P. 2d
818, 824 (1943)
16,32
City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789, 792
(1894)
36
Collins v. City of San Antonio, 443 S. W. 2d 563
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969)
40
Dooley Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company,
9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, 231, 24 A. L. R. 610
7,16
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354
P. 2d 105 (1960)
25
Hampton v. State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342,
455 P. 2d 708 (1968)
11
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 341 P. 2d 907
(1952)
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Holt v. State Road Commission, 511 P. 2d 1286, 30
Utah 2d 4 (1973)
22,25
Minmequa Lumber Co. v. City and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 196 P. 539 540-41 (1919)
36
Moorlane Company v. Highway Department, 384
S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
40
Morris v. Oregon Shortline R. Co., 36 Utah 14, 102
P. 629, 631 (1909)
17
Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505, 514
(1942)
16,32
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,
349 P. 2d 157 (1960)
12,36
State Road Commission v. Utah Sugar Go,, 22 Utah
2d 77, 448 P. 2d 901 (1968)
25
State by State Road Commission v. District Court
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d
502 (1938)

6

Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 28
Utah 201, 77 P. 849, 852

7

Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P. 2d 926
(1974)
29
TEXTS CITED

Nichols on Eminent Domain 2, Section 6.32

15

Nichols on Eminent Domain 3, Section 10.221 (2) at
369-70
15,32,38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
STATUTES CITED

Utah Code Annotated (1953) Section 63-30-4
Chapter 34, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Eminent Domain

i1
j
j

22
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

;

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BAILEY SERVICE & SUPPLY Corporation, a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13857

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and the pleadings on file, the sole question presented to the lower
Court was whether the construction of a viaduct by the
State Road Commission that prevented entry to Bailey
Service and Supply's warehouse by large capacity vehicles which had historically delivered most of the property stored therein was a destruction of or material interference with the right of access appurtenant to the
warehouse property so as to amount to a "taking" of
Bailey's property by the Commission.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On cross motions for summary judgment, the lower
Court by Memorandum Decision determined and held
that the construction odE the viaduct by the Commission
that prevented entry to Bailey Service and Supply's
warehouse by such large capacity vehicles was a destruction of the right of access appurtenant to the warehouse
property and, therefore, amounted to a "taking" of
Bailey's property by the Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Bailey Service and Supply seeks affirmance of the judgment of the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Since 1964 the property involved in this action has
been designed and used as a warehouse. (Paragraph 3,
Complaint, R. 85, admitted in paragraph 1 of Section
II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraph 2, Affidavit of William F.
Bailey, R. 45.) Its highest and best use is that of a warehouse. (Paragraph 5, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher,
R. 42.) For any structure to be useable as a warehouse,
access to it must exist for large-capacity motor vehicles.
(Paragraphs 5-7, Affidavit of Jesse A. Watson, R. 38-39).
Since 1964, the weight and size of the property stored
in the warehouse (such as highway truck tires and offthe-highway (heavy equipment tires)) has required that
such property be transported into and out of the building
by means of sizeable trucks. (Paragraph 7, Complaint,
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R. 85, admitted in Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer,
R. 68; Paragraph 4, Affidavit of William F. Bailey, R.
45.) Approximately 70% of the goods destined for storage in the warehouse arrive in Salt Lake City aboard
40-foot trailers hauled by common or contract motor carriers. Due to shipping economy and convenience, ordinarily each of such trailers contains nothing but goods
consigned to the warehouse. (Paragraph 5, Affidavit of
William F. Bailey, R. 45-46.) A large doorway opening
on Fourth South had historically furnished such trucks
with access to the warehouse. Until 1970, Fourth South
Street in front of the warehouse had been sufficiently
wide (approximately 80 feet, 40 feet to the center line)
to enable those large trucks to maneuver through said
doorway. (Paragraph 8, Complaint, R. 86, admitted in
Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraphs 3
(R. 45) and 6 (R. 46), Affidavit of William F. Bailey;
Paragraph 4, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, (R. 42).)
During 1970, the Utah State Road Commission began construction of a viaduct running longitudinally
along the center of Fourth South. The width of the
viaduct is less than that of Fourth South, leaving a strip
of the original road along its southern boundary. That
strip fronts pkintiffs' warehouse and is wide enough (22
feet 8 inches) to accommodate one lane of east-bound
traffic. The strip is not, however, sufficiently wide to
enable trucks of the necessary size to maneuver through
the large doorway which in the past furnished access to
plaintiff's warehouse. (Paragraphs 9-11, Complaint, R.
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86, admitted in Paragraph 1 of Section II, Answer, R.
68; Paragraphs 7-10, Affidavit of William F. Bailey, R.
46-47.) Prior to the construction of the Fourth South
viaduct), the warehouse had a fair market value of $42,500.00. (Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher,
R. 43.) As a consequence of the interference with access
occasioned by the viaduct, the value of the warehouse
property was decreased in the amount of $8,700.00. (Paragraph 14, Complaint, R. 87, admitted, Paragraph 2, Section II, Answer, R. 68; Paragraph 3, Stipulation, R. 71;
Paragraph 6, Affidavit of Raymond S. Fletcher, R. 43.)
The parties to this litigation executed a Stipulation
which recited in paragraph 2 that the parties had discussed plaintiff's rights and remedies with respect to
the interference of access alleged in the Complaint. (R.
70-72). Paragraph 2 further recited that as a result of
those discussions, the differences of the parties related
only to the issue of whether the interference and damage referred to in the Complaint amounted to a "taking"
of plaintiff's property by defendant. Paragraph 3 of the
Stipulation recited that this was the only issue which
need be and which may be decided in an action to be
filed by Bailey Service and Supply. The parties, further,
agreed that if plaintiff prevailed on that issue, defendant
would pay plaintiff $8,700.00 (Paragraph 3) and that
defendant waived the defenses of sovereign immunity,
notice (Paragraph 4) and any right it may have had to
a cost bond. (Paragraph 5.)
The Honorable Judge of the lower Court, per Mem-
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orandum Decision (R. 11-12) and after viewing the premises, as indicated therein (R. 12), determined and held
that the State's defense of sovereign immunity would
not apply if a taking of Respondent's property by the
Commission had occurred. The Court then determined
and held that the above facts amounted to a destruction
of the right of access appurtenant to Bailey Service and
Supply's property for the only vehicles that must have
access thereto for the property to be used as a warehouse,
as it historically had been, and a taking had, therefore,
occurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE STATE
ROAD COMMISSION AS THIS ACTION IS
SUBSTANTIVELY NOT A SUIT FOR MONEY DAMAGES AGAINST THIS STATE
AGENCY BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, A
CONSENT BY THE COMMISSION TO A DETERMINATION BY THE LOWER COURT
OF W H E T H E R THE ABOVE FACTS
AMOUNTED TO A TAKING AND AN
AGREEMENT BY THE COMMISSION TO
COMPENSATE BAILEY SERVICE AND
SUPPLY IN THE AMOUNT STIPULATED
IF THE LOWER COURT FOUND AGAINST
THE STATE ON THIS ISSUE MADE FOR
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THE PURPOSE OF EXPEDITING RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY AND TO
PREVENT BAILEY FROM FILING A SUIT
SEEKING TO ENJOIN THE INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FROM
CONSTRUCTING THE VIADUCT.
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The
statutory eminent domain law of this State is based
upon the premise that when an arm of government seeks
to acquire private property or rights therein it will initiate condemnation proceedings. Chapter 34, Title 78
U. C. A. (1953) Eminent Domain. However, prior to
the execution of the Stipulation on file herein (discussed
infra), the facts of the instant action presented the situation of a taking or damaging of Bailey Service and Supply's property by the State for which the State had
neither instituted condemnation proceedings nor agreed
to pay compensation.
The most exhaustive prior decision of this Court on
the rights and remedies of an aggrieved private party for
the failure of the State to condemn or pay compensation
for a taking or damaging by it is State by State Road
Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District
94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1938). In this case the injured parties sued the State Road Commission and the
contractor, seeking to enjoin the construction of a viaduct
which they alleged would interfere with their convenient
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access to the property and deprive them of their easement of light and air. The State sought a writ of prohibition from this Court alleging the action was barred by
sovereign immunity. The Attorney General argued that
no "taking" had occurred as the state had not sought
"to enter upon, take, or appropriate any part of the plaintiff's lands", and, therefore, "the abutting owners, if
damaged," could "present a claim for compensation to
the State oBard of Examiners" under the statutory predecessor of Section 63-6-11, U. C. A. (1953). 94 Utah at
392.
This Court, citing Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western
Railway Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849, 852, and Dooley
Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company, 9 Utah 31,
33 P. 229, 231, 24 A. L. R. 610, to the effect that ". . .
any substantial interference with private property . . .
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is
in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in
fact and law a taking, in the constitutional sense, to the
extent of the damages suffered, even though the title
and possession of the owner remained undisturbed . . . ,"
(94 Utah at 384) thought that under this standard the
allegations of the Complaint in the lower Court amounted
to a "taking". 94 Utah at 400. This Court went on to
conclude that the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity applied to suits against the state or the State Road Commission by a private party for a taking or damaging as
an alternative remedy for enforcement of Article I, Section 22 was available to the injured private party:
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We think if a case arises where there is no
other method of enforcing a constitutional right
except by suit against the State, then it must
be considered that the State has given its consent to be used in such a case. I n this case,
however, we hold that the Road Commissioners individually may be enjoined from proceeding in a manner forbidden by the Constitution—that it is therefore unnecessary to permit
suit against the State itself or its agency. 94
Utah at 399.
This Court indicated this remedy of injunction against
the individual Commission members was available regardless of whether a taking or damaging occurred, since
the remedy for damaging of presenting a claim to the
Board of Examiners failed to satisfy due process. 94
Utah 400. It was, thus, unnecessary for the Court to decide whether a taking or a damaging occurred under the
facts then before the Court, as the remedy of injunction
against the individual Commissioners was deemed available for either. This Court summarized its conclusions
as follows:
If the construction involved in this case constitutes either a taking or a damaging of the
property of the owner of abutting land, then
the Road Commissioner's should either (1)
agree with the landowner upon the question
of damages or (2) condemn . . . , or (3) upon
suit for injunction being brought, they (or the
State Road Commission as such) should consent to a determination by the Court.. .of the
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question whether the property will be damaged, and, if so, the amount which will constitute "just compensation" for the taking or
damaging, and should consent to judgment for
damages if any are found. If the Road Commissioners refuse to pay the damage claimed
by the landowner, and refuse to institute or
submit to proceedings for determination of the
question whether any damages will result and
if so the amount thereof, then it seems clear
that they are acting in violation of the constitutional guaranty and they should be enjoined
from proceeding with the construction, (emphasis added) 94 Utah at 401-402.
Justice Wolfe dissented. He was of the view that
since the proposed construction of the viaduct required
that only a more circuitous route be followed to reach
the abutting property, no taking had occurred but the
private parties had suffered only consequential damage.
94 Utah at 431. He differed from the majority opinion
only in that he was of the opinion that the remedy for
"damage" under the Constitutional provision quoted
above of applying for compensation to the Board of Examiners satisfied due process and, therefore, an injunctive action against the individual commissioners should
lie for a taking only and not for damaging:
The remedy to prevent a "taking" without
agreed compensation or condemnation would
be by injunction because such a taking would
be without authority. The remedy for damages
caused by an agency of the state performing
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its functions would be enforced as it is enforced
in all other cases against the state where remedy is not specifically given by statute, to wit,
by resort to the Board of Examiners. 94 Utah
2d at 408.
Justice Wolfe went on to distinguish between taking and
damaging. In the course of that discussion, he stated:
On the side of the line where acts done in pursuance of an authorized objective are not authorized, are all those cases which involve an
actual taking of property. The State Road,
Commissioners do not act within their authorization when they attempt to build a road over
my property without acquiring it or arranging for compensation. But, ordinarily, when
they do not physically take any property, but
only improve or build on the State's own highway, which is one of the purposes of their
existence, they act within their authority, and
any consequential damage which may incidentally occur does not divest them of authority. It is true that they may in some cases so
raise a grade or build a viaduct or do some
other act on the State's highway which, while
not actually intruding on the property of another may cause such a serious interference
with the enjoyment of that abutting property
as to amount to a "taking", (emphasis added)
94 Utah at 433-434.
Later case law of this Court has accepted Justice
Wolfe's analysis in his; dissent in the Fourth Judicial
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District Court case on the points in which it differed
from the majority opinion. In Hampton v. State Road
Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 455 P. 2d 708 (1968), private parties, inter alia, sought to enjoin the individual
members of the Commission from further construction
of Interstate 15, alleging that a fence and guard rail
erected through the street which fronted their property,
and into which their driveway ran, substantially interfered with their right of access and amounted to a taking of their property without condemnation or agreed
compensation. This court observed:
This distinction between a "taking" and consequential damage was first developed in Utah
by Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in
State by State Road Commission v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District (94 Utah 384,
78 P . 2d 02 (1973)). H e stated that the remedy to prevent a "taking" without agreed compensation or condemnation would be by injunction because such taking would be without
authority. On the other hand, an injunction
will not be allowed where the State Road Commission neither physically takes any property
nor while not actually intruding does not cause
such a serious interference with the enjoyment
of the abutting property as to amount to a
"taking", since any consequential damage
which may incidentally occur or be caused by
the State Road Commissioners' acts does not
divest them of their authority, (emphasis added) 21 Utah 2d at 344-345.
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In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d
100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), the Commission placed a concrete divider in the highway, thereby requiring southbound traffic to follow a more circuitous route to reach
plaintiffs business. This Court held an extraordinary
writ of mandamus to compel the state to pay damages
unavailable to plaintiff as sovereign immunity was a bar
to suit and plaintiff could not do indirectly what it could
not do directly. This Court also held that the injury
suffered in requiring a more circuitous route to be
traveled to reach abutting property was consequential
damage.
In Anderson Investment Corporation v. State, 28
Utah 2d 379, 503 P. 2d 144 (1972), Anderson sought to
enjoin the individual members of the commission from
proceeding with construction of a viaduct, alleging the
viaduct so interfered with its easement of light, air, view
and access as to amount to a "taking". 28 Utah 2d at
381. However, as in the Fourth Judicial District Court
and Springville Banking cases, the only damage suffered
as a result of the highway impediment was the need for
Anderson's customers to take a more circuitous route
to enter Anderson's property. Anderson relied on the
majority opinion in the Fourth Judicial District Court
case claiming the injunction action would lie whether
or not a taking or damaging occurred. In Anderson, this
Court accepted the analysis of Justice Wolfe's dissent,
Le. that an interference with access by the State resulting only in the necessity to follow a more circuitous
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route was consequential damage, not a taking, and that
the remedy of injunction against the individual Commissioners would not lie for a claim of consequential
damage.
The reason these circuity of route cases result only
in consequential damage, and not a taking (as the majority in the Fourth Judicial District Court case thought
but did not hold) is best explained in Hampton, supra:
The [right of access] does not include the right
to travel in any particular direction from one's
property or upon any particular part of the
public highway right-of-way because, after
one is upon the highway he has the same right
as all other travelers and the right of travel
is a public right and controlled by the police
power of the State. . . . [W]hat the police
power may give an abutting property owner in
the way of traffic on the highway, it may take
away, and by any such diversion of traffic the
State and any of its agencies are not liable.
21 Utah 2d 346-347 (quoting from State
Highway Commission v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d
855 (Mo. 1965).
The present state of Utah law, therefore, given the
situation of the construction by the Commission of a
viaduct, divider, guardrail or other impediment in the
highway, which takes or damages private property or a
right therein for which the state does not condemn or
pay agreed compensation, is as follows:
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(1) If no other way exists to provide the protection of Article I, Section 22, the section will be held
self-executing;
(2) Sovereign immunity is a bar to direct suit
against the State or its agencies for a taking or damaging; however, if a taking occurs, an injunction action will
lie against the individual Commissioners pending condemnation or agreed compensation and if a damaging occurs,
recourse is available to the Board of Examiners.
(3) A taking occurs and the injunctive remedy is
available if the State in erecting such an impediment
actually intrudes on private property or, while not actually intruding, causes such a serious interference with
with the abutting property as to amonunt to a taking;
(4) If the impediment results only in a more circuitous route being required to be traveled to reach the
abutting property, the injury is consequential damage,
not a taking, as once upon the highway, travel is a public
right regulated by the police power and the state incurs
no liability for altering the flow or direction of traffic;
and
(5) If actual intrusion upon the abutting property
or such serious interference amounting to a taking occurs
thereto from the impediment and the individual Commission members are sought to be enjoined from construction pending condemnation or agreed compensation,
the Commission should consent to a determination by
the Court of the question of whether a taking has oc-
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curred and, if so, should consent to a judgment for
reasonable compensation if any be found.
The problem now becomes to apply the above to the
instant situation as it existed during the construction of
the viaduct and thereafter.
Admittedly the taking found by the lower Court does
not involve the physical appropriation by the State of
tangible real property owned by Bailey Service and Supply. Per subparagraph 3 above, however, under well established law a "taking" is present not only when private
property is actually intruded upon, but also when a property right recognized by the law — such as an easement
of access — is destroyed or materially interfered with.
The case law of this Court as well as that of other
jurisdictions has uncontrovertably established that an
owner of property abutting on a street is vested with a
private easement in that street for access to his property.
The principle is enunciated as follows in 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain Section 6.32 (3d ed. rev. 1970):
Even though an owner of land abutting on a
street does not own the fee of the street he is
in possession of easements of light and air over
such street as well as easements of view and
access. All of such easements constitute property for the taking of which he is entitled to
compensation. (Footnotes omitted).
Elaboration on the foregoing statement is found in 3
Nichols, Eminent Domain Section 10.221(2) at 369-70
(3d ed. rev. 1965):
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[ I ] is now held very generally throughout the
United States that, however a street may have
been originally laid out, if the public has taken
the fee, there have attached automatically to
the abutting lands easements of access, light
and air from the street, which are taken in the
constitutional sense by the use of the street in
a manner not constituting a proper exercise
of the highway easement and interfering with
such access, light and air. I t has been said that
an owner of property abutting upon a public
street has a property right in the nature of an
easement in the street which is appurtenant to
his abutting property and which is his private
right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the public. (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis in original).
See also Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144
P. 2d 818, 823 (1943); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123
P. 2d 505, 514 (1942). Numerous decisions of this Court
have established the same principle. The principle was
originally laid down by ithis Court in Dooly Block v. Salt
Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893):
Nor does it matter, in this case, that the fee
is in the city in trust for the use of the public,
instead of in the abutting owner in trust for
street uses: Equally in both cases the abutting
owners are entitled to the use of the street as
a means of access to their lots, and for light and
air. If the fee is in the city, the rights of the
abutter are in the nature of equitable easements in fee; if in the abutter, they are is their
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Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Stipulation on file herein,
the proper interpretation of which, it is submitted, will
be depositive of this appeal, provide as follows:
2. I n the past the parties have discussed the
rights and remedies of Plaintiff which obtain,
or which may obtain, with respect to the interference with access which is alleged in the Complaint. As a result of such discussions, the parties have agreed that their differences relate
only to the following issue: whether the interference and damage referred to in the Complaint constitutes a "taking"of Plaintiff's
property by Defendant.
3. So as to expedite resolution of the controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant, the
only issue which need be and which may be decided in the action to be filed by Plaintiff is
that set forth in Paragraph 2 above. In the
event Plaintiff prevails on said issue, the compensation to be paid to it by Defendant shall
be the sum of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($8,700.00), together with interest thereon at eight percent (8%) per annum from December 1, 1970. (R. 71).
From the above-quoted paragraphs, it is obvious that
the facts of this case are that in 1970 and 71, during the
construction period of the viaduct, Bailey Service and
Supply was of the opinion that the viaduct, when completed, would unreasonably interfere with or destroy its
right of access by preventing entry to the warehouse by
large capacity trucks which had theretofore delivered the
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property historically stored in the warehouse. It, therefore, contemplated filing an action against the individual
road Commissioners seeking to enjoin them from further
construction pending condemnation or agreed compensation, and communicated this intention to the Attorney
General's office. Though the record does not so indicate,
at this time the Assistant Attorney General was provided
with a copy of a memorandum of law prepared by the
law firm reperesenting Respondent wherein it was concluded that the course of action seeking such injunctive
relief should be followed. The sitate, by the above-quoted
paragraphs of the Stipulation, agreed that Bailey had
suffered $8,700.00 in damage but thought the interference
with access described in the Statement of Facts above
insufficient to constitute a "taking" but amounted to
only "consequential damage". The State, therefore, by
entering into the Stipulation on file in this action, consented to submit the sole issue of whether a taking existed to the lower Court and agreed to compensate Bailey
in the stipulated amount if the taking issue were resolved
adversely to it. The State, therefore, followed the procedure suggested by the prior case law of this Court
outlined in subparagraph 5 above with only two modifications: it consented to a judicial determination of the
issue of "taking" before any action had been filed for
injunctive relief and it agreed to pay a stipulated amount
as compensation if the issue of taking were resolved
against it. The State preferred to have the controversy
so resolved so as to expedite its resolution and, most importantly, to obviate the risk of interference with the
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Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Stipulation on file herein,
the proper interpretation of which, it is submitted, will
be depositive of this appeal, provide as follows:
2. I n the past the parties have discussed the
rights and remedies of Plaintiff which obtain,
or which may obtain, with respect to the interference with access which is alleged in the Complaint. As a result of such discussions, the parties have agreed that their differences relate
only to the following issue: whether the interference and damage referred to in the Complaint constitutes a "taking"of Plaintiff's
property by Defendant.
3. So as to expedite resolution of the controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant, the
only issue which need be and which may be decided in the action to be filed by Plaintiff is
that set forth in Paragraph 2 above. In the
event Plaintiff prevails on said issue, the compensation to be paid to it by Defendant shall
be the sum of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($8,700.00), together with interest thereon at eight percent (8%) per annum from December 1, 1970. (R. 71).
From the above-quoted paragraphs, it is obvious that
the facts of this case are that in 1970 and 71, during the
construction period of the viaduct, Bailey Service and
Supply was of the opinion that the viaduct, when completed, would unreasonably interfere with or destroy its
right of access by preventing entry to the warehouse by
large capacity trucks which had theretofore delivered the
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property historically stored in the warehouse. It, therefore, contemplated filing an action against the individual
road Commissioners seeking to enjoin them from further
construction pending condemnation or agreed compensation, and communicatee! this intention to the Attorney
General's office. Though the record does not so indicate,
at this time the Assistant Attorney General was provided
with a copy of a memorandum of law prepared by the
law firm reperesenting Respondent wherein it was concluded that the course of action seeking such injunctive
relief should be followed. The sitate, by the above-quoted
paragraphs of the Stipulation, agreed that Bailey had
suffered $8,700.00 in damage but thought the interference
with access described in the Statement of Facts above
insufficient to constitute a "taking" but amounted to
only "consequential damage". The State, therefore, by
entering into the Stipulation on file in this action, consented to submit the sole issue of whether a taking existed to the lower Court and agreed to compensate Bailey
in the stipulated amount if the taking issue were resolved
adversely to it. The State, therefore, followed the procedure suggested by the prior case law of this Court
outlined in subparagraph 5 above with only two modifications: it consented to a judicial determination of the
issue of "taking" before any action had been filed for
injunctive relief and it agreed to pay a stipulated amount
as compensation if the issue of taking were resolved
against it. The State preferred to have the controversy
so resolved so as to expedite its resolution and, most importantly, to obviate the risk of interference with the
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construction of the viaduct, no matter how short in
duration,, if an injunction were sought and granted. The
Commission, clearly, by prior case law suggestion of this
Court, is authorized to agree to pay stipulated compensation on such terms.
The Honorable Judge of the lower Court in his Memorandum Decision held that the defense of sovereign
immunity would not apply, since he had concluded that
the acts referred to in the Complain constituted a "taking". He so found for the facts and reasons enumerated
above. Further, the Assistant Attorney General in the
State's brief (page 13) also recognizes that the Hampton
case, supra, "dearly established that the principle of
Sovereign Immunity must yield in the case of a complete
or nearly complete denial of access" and admits that he
regards this rule as "salutary". The Assistant Attorney
General, therefore^ concedes that if the issue of whether
a "taking" exists were resolved against the Commission,
the Commission acted within its authority in agreeing to
pay compensation in the stipulated amount for the taking
to expedite the resolution of this controversy and in lieu
of Bailey Service and Supply bringing an injunctive action against the individual Commissioners.
As to the arguments of the Assistant Attorney General in the State's brief, he first contends that, assuming
a taking occurred, this is a direct action against a State
agency for money damages therefor and is barred by
sovereign immunity. This argument is based on three
assumptions:
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(1) That the State has not consented to such a
suit for inverse condemnation by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sections 63-30-1 through 63-30-4, U.
C. A. (1953);
(2) That paragraph 4 of the Stipulation entered
into by the parties on file in this action wherein the
Assistant Attorney General waived the defense of sovereign immunity was beyond his authority as such waiver
may only be accomplished by the people speaking through
the legislature; and
(3) That during the construction of the viaduct,
Bailey Service and Supply failed to file an injunctive
action against the individual Commissioners pending condemnation or agreed compensation and, having let this
remedy pass, now seeks to sue the State Road Commission directly.
Respondent concedes the first assumption. Admittedly, no statute in Utah, including the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, gives an owner whose property
is to be, is being or has been, taken the right to bring
an "inverse condemnation" suit, i.e. to directly sue the
sovereign appropriate? for compensation for the taking.
See Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, supra, 30 Utah
2d 4 at 6, which specifically holds the State has not
waived immunity for inverse condemnation by the Governmental Immunity Act.
Respondent, however, respectfully submits that the
first assumption has nothing to do with this litigation.
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I, Section 22 should in this situation only be deemed selfexecuting.
The Assistant Attorney General in the State's brief
next seeks to avoid the entire question of whether the
Commissioners or the Commission as such could consent
to judicial resolution of the taking issue and agree to
compensate respondent in a stipulated amount if the
issue were determined adversely to the State prior to,
in lieu of, and to prevent Bailey Service and Supply from
filing an injunctive action against the individual Commissioners by arguing that the injury to Respondent as
a result of the construction of the viaduct is not a taking
but only consequential damage and, therefore, any testing of this issue by injunctive action would, of necessity,
have failed as such relief is barred by sovereign immunity
if only consequential damage is suffered, citing Springville Banking, supra; Anderson Investment, supra; Fairdough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P. 2d
105 (1960); Hjorth v. Whittnburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.
907 (1952); Holt v. State Road Commission, 511 P. 2d
1286, 30 Utah 2d 4 (1973); State Road Commission v.
Utah Sugar Company, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 901
(1968).
This argument, obviously, assumes the very issue
presented by this litigation, i.e. whether a taking or damaging occurred, to have already been decided in favor of
the State. It goes without saying that if Respondent
suffered only consequential damage, sovereign immunity
would have barred injunctive relief against the individual
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Commissioners. The lower Court, however, held a "taking" occurred and on page 13 of its brief, the State concedes if that is the case, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar this action.
The Assistant Attorney General could however, be
taken to be contending, as the Attorney General unsuccessfully argued in both the Fourth Judicial District
Court and the Hampton cases, supra, that if the State,
pursuant to its police power, erects a viaduct, median
divider, or other impediment solely within the parallel
confines of the highway, no taking can ever occur as an
actual infringement on private property is required therefor.
This is, of course, not the state of the case law of
this Court and the injustice of any such rule is too obvious to require refutation. Per the holdings of and quotations from Fourth Judicial District Court, supra; Hampton, supra; Dooley Block, supra; and Morris, supra, the
destruction or substantial impairment of an appurtenant
easement of access is a taking. The above cases cited by
the Assistant Attorney General in no way militate against
this long-established case law rule. In Springuille Banking, supra; and Anderson, supra; this Court held only
that the requirement that a more circuitous route be
followed as a result of the cx)nstruction of a viaduct, island
or other impediment does not sufficiently impair access
to amount to a taking for the reason given in Hampton,
supra; that once upon the highway, the right of travel
is a public one and the flow of traffic may be diverted
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without liability to the State. This Court, in the course
of the Springville Banking opinion so recognized:
Access has not been denied. Interfered with, it
is true, but not to an unreasonable extent.
Southbound travelers seeking plaintiff's property have to travel but a quarter-mile further
to reach it. 10 U. 2d at 103.
In Fairclough, supra, the State exercised its police
power to lower the grade of a highway below plaintiff's
abutting land. Plaintiffs sued for deprivation of convenient access but plaintiffs did not have an existing driveway or other means of access which could be deprived.
This Court followed Springville Banking and held such
consequential interference to be barred by the doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity. As the Hampton case specifically points out:
an easement of access contemplates a travelled
way from the property to the highway, (quoting Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14
Utah 2d 305, 309 (1963). 21 Utah 2d at 346.
In Hjorth v. Whittenburg, this Court only held that
while plaintiffs would have been able to bring an injunctive action pending condemnation or agreed compensation against the individual Commissioners for the raising of a highway grade cutting off access to plaintiff's
abutting property, an action for damages against these
individual Commissioners was barred by the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity.
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In Utah Sugar, supra, that defendant had to take a
more circuitous route to inspect its reservoir was held
not compensable as severance damage in a condemnation
case, citing inter alia, Hampton.
In Holt, supra, either another circuitous route or
lack of established access case was presented to this
Court and it was held the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity was applicable. The Court specifically recognized,
however, "there was no taking of property involved in
this action," 30 Utah 2d at 5.
This Court has uniformly indicated that if a highway impediment not actually infringing upon private
property constructed by the State in the exercise of its
police power substantially interferes with the right of
access, a taking has occurred. As the Hampton decision
points out:
Every citizen holds his property subject to the
valid exercise of the police power. A party may
recover only when his private property rights
are taken, but not for rights he enjoys as a
member of the public. The right of an abutting
owner to and from the street is a private right,
in the sense that it is something different from
the right which the members of the public have
to use the street for public purposes. Conformably to this doctrine, and in part based
upon it, a person owning . . . premises abutting
on the public highway or street, whose right of
access to the same is unreasonably . . . obstructed, may recover. . . . 21 Utah 2d at 347.
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Further, this Court indicated in Utah State Road Commission v. Miya,
Utah 2d
, 526 P. 2d 926 (1974):
The rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting
owner on a street; they constitute property
rights forming part of the owner's estate. These
substantial property rights, although subject
to reasonable regulation, may not be taken
away or impaired without just compensation.
The erection of a permanent structure within
a public highway of such a character as to rank
as a proper highway use, even if it diminishes
the value of abutting property, is not in and
of itself a damage in the constitutional sense.
Unless the structure violates some right appurtenant to the abutting property or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury
the owner is not entitled to compensation. One
of the rights appurtenant to abutting property
is that of receiving light and air from the highway, and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation for infringement of his right to light
and air by a structure in the highway, even if
it is a proper highway use. Id. at 928-929.
For the above reasons, Respondent Bailey Service
and Supply Co. respectfully submits that the resolution
of the issue of whether the above-refearenced facts amount
to a taking will be dispositive of the State's belated assertion of the sovereign immunity defense. If a taking
occurred, and, as pointed out under Point II below, it has,
sovereign immunity is inapplicable.
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POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE DENIAL OF ACCESS
TO BAILEY SERVICE AND SUPPLY'S
WAREHOUSE BY LARGE CAPACITY VEHICLES WHICH DELIVERED MOST OF
THE PROPERTY DESTINED FOR STORAGE THEREIN AS A RESULT OF THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIADUCT SO
SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERED WITH OR
DENIED THE PROPERTY RIGHT OR
EASEMENT OF ACCESS APPURTENANT
THERETO AS TO AMOUNT TO A TAKING
OF BAILEY'S PROPERTY BY THE STATE.
Per the Statement of Facts above, Bailey Service
and Supply's abutting property had been used as a warehouse since 1964. This was its highest and best use. For
any structure to be used as a warehouse, access to it
must exist for large capacity vehicles as such are in standard use by common and contract motor carriers and,
due to shipping economy and convenience, such vehicles
ordinarily contain nothing but goods consigned to a single
warehouse. Approximately 70% of the goods destined
for storage in Bailey Service and Supply's warehouse
historically had arrived at the warehouse aboard such
large capacity vehicles not only because such form of
transportation is customary but also because the weight
and size of the property stored in the warehouse (such
as highway truck tires and off^he-highway (heavy equip-
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meant tires)) required that such property be transported
by large capacity vehicles. The viaduct totally destroyed
access to the warehouse by these large capacity vehicles.
Thus, the viaduct eliminated one of the attributes which
must have existed for the subject property to be employed for its highest and best use. As a consequence,
the value of the warehouse property declined by $8,700.00.
By the Stipulation on file herein, the only issue for
decision in this case is whether the interference with
access occasioned by the viaduct fronting Bailey Service
and Supply's property constitutes a "taking" of its property by the Commission. The parties agreed that, in
the event such interference is held to be a taking, the
compensation to be paid to Plaintiff by Defendant shall
be the sum of $8,700.00, together with interest thereon
at eight percent (8%) per annum from December 1, 1970.
The parties disagree only with respect to the legal conclusion to be drawn from such facts, i.e., whether or not
under such facts the interference with access involved
constitutes a "taking" of Plaintiff's property or something less. The lower Court after viewing the premises,
held and determined these facts amounted to a taking.
Well established law makes clear that the lower Court's
decision was correct.
Per discussion under Issue I, supra, numerous decisions of this Court as well as those of other jurisdictions
have established that an owner of property abutting on
a street is vested with a private easement in that street
for access to his property. Further, as established under
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Issue I above, substantial interference with this right-ofaocess, even though not caused by a physical intrusion
onto such property, amounts to or constitutes a "taking".
Therefore, the property involved in this action had appurtenant to it an easement of access to Fourth South.
The real question of this action is the amount of interference with Respondent's access which is permissable
before a "taking" is found to be present. Otherwise stated,
the issue is whether this Court will substitute its judgment for that of the lower Court, arrived at after viewing
the premises, and hold the denial of access to the only
vehicles that must have access for the property to be
used as a warehouse (its highest and best use) did not
so interfere with the right of access as to constitute a
taking.
It is well settled that the extent of the easement
for access is tested and determined by the nature of the
abutting property to which such easement is appurtenant.
The general rule is set forth in 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain §10.221 [2] at 370 (3d ed. rev. 1965):
The extent of the easement of access may be
said to be that which is reasonably required,
giving consideration to all the purposes to
which the property is adapted. (Footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d
818, 824 (19453); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.
2d 505, 514 (1942).
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The facts of this case are that the highest and best
use of the realty involved in this action is that of a warehouse. For a building to be susceptible to long-term use
as a warehouse, access to it must exist for large-capacity
motor vehicles. This is true of the property involved
here as well as in general. Until construction of the
Fourth South viaduct, access for large vehicles existed
and was used in connection with Plaintiff's warehouse
(Bailey Affidavit). Thus, the facts present here establish: (a) that Plaintiffs property is best suited for use
as a warehouse; and (b) that as such, the easement for
access reasonably required by the property is that necessary to provide ingress and egress for large vehicles.
As a result of the barrier which is created by the
viaduct, only a 22-foot-8-strip of road remains in front
of the warehouse. Due to its narrowness, that strip does
not provide large vehicles with access to Plaintiff's property. The Fourth South viaduct has therefore eliminated the access which is reasonably required in light of
the nature of Plaintiff's abutting tract and, under the
authorities discussed supra, a property right owned by
Plaintiff has been taken.
Admittedly the taking present here does not involve
the physical appropriation by the State of tangible property owned by Plaintiff. As indicated under Issue I above,
however, under well established law a "taking" is present
not only when tangible property is appropriated, but also
when a property right recognized by the law — such as an
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easement of access — is interfered with in a material way
or eliminated.
Although in the present case the State 1ms not physically intruded onto Plaintiff's tract, as is discussed herein
it has seriously interfered with Plaintiff's enjoyment of
the warehouse property, and in a manner which makes
such interference tantamount to a "taking." The interference involved here has a direct effect upon Plaintiff's
property, as distinguished from the business conduced
thereon. The property is improved with a structure the
highest and best use of which is a warehouse. To be
usable as such the structure must, understandably, be
accessible to vehicles capable of economically transporting commodities to and from the building. With elimination of the needed access comes substantial impairment
in the structure's utility as a warehouse. Here, the property itself — the land as improved — has been directly
affected, for the physical as well as the economic ability
to utilize such property for its intended and most productive use has been substantially impaired.
Reference to the Affidavit of William F. Bailey (R.
44-49) and Exhibit "A" attached thereto (R. 50) reveals
the severity of the interference occasioned by the Fourth
Souht viaduct. The warehouse structure occupies virtually all of the lot on which it is situated and it is appar^
ent that any vehicular traffic must enter directly from
Fourth South or not at all. Construction of the viaduct
resulted in the creation of a solid wall opposite all points
on the warehouse facing the street. The portion of Fourth
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South which remains useable with respect to the warehouse is only 22 feet 8 inches wide. Prior to the viaduct,
the large vehicles upon which warehouse utility is heavily
dependant had ample room within which to maneuver
into the building. The amount of room now remaining
is insufficient to allow such access. As a result, Plaintiffs warehouse property is no longer susceptible to longterm use as such (Watson Affidavit, R. 37-40) and the
value of such property has declined by $8,700.00 (Fletcher
Affidavit, R. 41-43). Even the State has admitted that
a decline in value of $8,700.00 has occurred (R. 71). When
compared to the warehouse property's pre-viaduct value
— $42,500 — it becomes apparent that the property has
diminished in value by slightly in excess of twenty percent. It could not be more dear that the viaduct has
materially, seriously, and directly affected the warehouse
property. Under the law of this State, a substantial interference with the ability to make use of one's property,
even thouh not caused by a physical initrusion onto such
property, is deemed a "taking."
The easement for access reasonably required by Respondent's warehouse property has been materially
abridged. That easement is a private right peculiar to
Respondent. Moreover, no other lot abutting on Fourth
South has characteristics which necessitate the type of
access required by Respondent's warehouse, and the
access to no other lot has been impaired by the viaduct's
presence in the way access to the warehouse has been
affected (Bailey Affidavit). As a result of the viaduct's
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interference, access to the warehouse for vehicles of the
necessary size was destroyed and Respondent's property
declined in value by $8,700.00. Clearly, therefore, the
injury to Respondent's lot was substantial and direct
and Respondent has been subjected to a special burden
not shared by the public in general. A "taking" is held
to be present under such circumstances, Hampton, supra,
21 Utah 2d at 347; See Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,
supra, 10 Utah 2d at 102-103; See also City of Pueblo
v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789, 792 (1894); Mirmequa
Lumber Co. v. City and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472,
196 P. 539, 540-41 (1919) (both holding that special injury to abutting property is present when access thereto
fe adversely affected by erection of a highway viaduct.)
The Assistant Attorney General in the State's brief
(pages 12-13) concedes the above rule that a taking occurs if an abutter's rights are unreasonably interfered
with. He argues, however, that, because the large capacity vehicles were forced to cross the center line of the
highway in entering the subject warehouse property, such
access would have been denied if the State had erected
a concrete median divider instead of a viaduct, and the
Springville Banking case, supra, held the erection of a
median divider to result only in consequential damage.
He further argues that some access remained to the property by the lane of traffic left by the construction of the
viaduct which is reasonable for many purposes, and such
remaining access was held reasonable in Anderson Investment, supra.
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In the first place, nowhere in the record does it appear that such vehicles crossed the center line of Fourth
South in entering the subject warehouse property. As
was specifically argued to the lower Court (R. 93), Exhibits A and B to Defendant's memorandum (R. 30-35),
which purport to establish that these vehicles crossed
the center line in so gaining such access, are unsigned,
unsworn to, and no indication is given as to who prepared them and what sources they were based upon.
They, therefore, can serve no purfbse whatsoever in this
proceeding and the lower Court properly ignored them.
Respondent's affidavits nowhere indicate that the vehicles crossed the center line to gain access. Paragraph
6 of Mr. Bailey's affidavit (R. 46), which the State
claims admits the necessity of such crossing, merely
states the width of the street to have been "more than
ample" to enable the vehicles to gain access to the warehouse door.
Secondly, even if the trucks did cross the center line,
the State completely misreads the Springville Banking
and Anderson cases. In Springville Banking, the construction of a concrete island within the highway over
its center line by the Commission prevented U turns and
left turns by traffic across the center of the highway to
reach plaintiff's business. 10 Utah 2d 101-102. Access
to that business was held interfered with, but not to an
unreasonable extent, because any and all traffic that
needed to reach plaintiffs property was required only
to follow a more circuitous route rather than follow the
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shorter one of crossing the center of the highway. This
Court in this decision, did not, as the Asistant Attorney
General argues, hold that a highway impediment preventing the crossing the center line could never so interfere
with access as to amount to a taking. On the contrary,
this Court quite properly, on the standard above quoted
from 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, §10.221(2), considered
the injury to plaintiff's property as it was then adapted
and held inconvenience to plaintiff's customers to be
consequential damage. Further, this decision is correct
per Hampton, supra, which holds that, pursuant to its
police power, the state may, by erecting a highway impediment, divert and regulate the flow of traffic or limit
access to what is reasonable "under the existing facts
and circumstances9' as these rights are enjoyed as members of the public are not private rights. 21 Utah 2d 347.
Being forced to follow a more tircuitous route to reach
property clearly is the deprivation of such a public right
and has nothing to do with the private right of access.
Exactly the same conclusion was reached in Anderson,
supra, where the construction of a viaduct resulted only
in the necessity that plaintiff and its customers travel
a more circuitous route to reach plaintiff's property rather
than cross the center line to do so. 28 Utah 2d 380-381.
Hampton, supra, states the identical rule as Nichols,
i.e^ that the right of access is a private right, and, if it
is unreasonably obstructed in view of the type of property involved, damages are recoverable if particular, direct and substantial. 21 Utah 2d at 347. Per above,
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neither Springuille Banking nor Anderson militate against
this result. In view of the type of property involved, they
both hold that access thereto was not unreasonably interfered with as any traffic required to reach such property could still do so if it followed a more circuitous route
rather than the shorter one of crossing the center line.
That, as pointed out above, is simply not the case on the
instant facts. No matter what route the trucks followed,
they could not enter the subject warehouse property as
a result of the construction of the viaduct.
This rule of Nichols and Hampton that the reasonableness of the interference of access must be determined
with a view to the type of property involved and the
purpose to which it is adapted to decide whether the interference amounts to a taking is also dispositive of the
Assistant Attorney General's Argument that some access
remains which is reasonable for many purposes. Such
assertion is true: some access does remain. But land
abutting on a street is legally entitled to access which
is reasonable in view of the type of property involved.
Warehouse properties in general, and Respondent's property in particular, must be accessible to vehicles of a
size enabling the large-volume transfer of goods to and
from the facility. Such access has, with respect to Respondent's property, been eliminated by the viaduct.
This rule is also dispositive of the Assistant Attorney
General's argument that Respondent is attempting to
ripen a permissive use, that of crossing the center line,
into a right by adverse possession against the sovereign.
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Obviously and clearly, the right of access appurtenant
to Respondent's abutting property was not acquired by
adverse possession but is an easement or property right
of a permanent character forming part of the owner's
estate. Hampton, supra, 21 Utah 2d at 345. In any event,
the record contains no proper evidence tending to establish that crossing of the center line was necessary to
gain access to the warehouse.
The State lastly claims Moorlane Company v. Highway Department' 384 S. W. 2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) and Collins v. City of San Antonio, 443 S. W. 2d
563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) to be on all fours with and
dispositive of the issue involved in this appeal. Collins
is merely another circuity of route case and is distinguished above. As to Moorlane, even if this Court permits the decision of an intermediate appellate Texas
Court to serve as the basis for the law of this state (and
overrule Hampton, supra) in that case at 418, large
trucks did not deliver most of the goods to the warehouse, as they did here, and both large and small trucks
could still unload at a truck bay, which did not exist here,
so access was held not unreasonably denied.
In sum, therefore, viewing Respondent's property
for the purpose to which it is adapted and which is its
highest and best use, i.e., a warehouse, the denial of
access to it by the very vehicles required for the property to be so used amounts to a taking of Respondent's
property by the Commission as a result of the constitution of the viaduct.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons: (1) the defense of sovereign immunity is unavailable to the State as its consent
to pay compensation in the stipulated amount on the
resolution of the taking issue against it prior to, in lieu
of and to prevent Respondent from seeking an injunction
pending condemnation or agreed compensation is within
the authority of the Commission; and (2) the destruction
of access for the very vehicles necessary for the use of
Respondent property as a warehouse, as it historically
had been, substantially interferes with the appurtenant
property right of access thereto and, therefore, amounts
to or constitutes a taking of such private property by
the State.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
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